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Abstract
The Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA) of the
Plant Treaty is the primary legal tool for making monetary
benefit sharing work. International public law, including the
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (ITPGRFA), is binding on states and have no legally
binding effect on private companies. Access and benefit‐
sharing, both under the ITPGRFA and the convention on
biological diversity (CBD), aim at altering the actions of private
users and companies. This article analyses the SMTA from a
contract‐law perspective raising the question whether the
SMTA can work as a binding contract? For a contract to work
it must establish legally binding and enforceable obligations on
a user of plant genetic resources. The method is to analyse the
current SMTA from a contract legal language perspective. It
will investigate, ways of coining the obligations in the wording,
unclear trigger‐points, lack of remedies against breach of
contract and limited enforcement mechanisms can explain lack
of user payment. It will draw on contract‐law research to
outline possible ways forward to an improved SMTA. The main
aim is to contribute to a future improvement of a second
generation SMTA.
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1 | INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE SCENE
Is the current Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA), 2006 of the Plant Treaty functioning as a legally
binding and enforceable contract imposing obligations on a user of plant genetic resources? This article analyzes
the SMTA, currently in use, from a contract legal language perspective. The aim is to identify legal obstacles and
functional binding elements and, so that a next‐generation SMTA can be coined to encourage or enforce any user
to comply with the objectives of the multilateral system (MLS). Specific proposals for the next round of negotiation
are presented in each section.
The objectives of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA), 2001,
adopted in 2001 and in force since 2004, are to promote the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources
for food and agriculture (PGRFA)1 and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of these
resources. Diverse benefits may derive from the use of plants. Plant breeding is one such benefit, as it improves food
production; indeed, access to plant material is recognized as a benefit in itself in itself for global food production. This
article examines sharing of the monetary benefits from commercial users. Is the SMTA likely to require mandatory
monetary payment to the Benefit‐sharing Fund? The broader spectrum of nonmonetary benefits is not the topic here.
The MLS for access and benefit sharing was made operational by the conclusion of the SMTA. According to its
preamble:
The Contracting Parties to the Treaty, in the exercise of their sovereign rights over their Plant
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, have established a Multilateral System, both to fa-
cilitate access to Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture and to share, in a fair and
equitable way, the benefits arising from the utilization of these resources, on a complementary and
mutually reinforcing basis. (Emphasis added)
When the SMTA entered into force in 2013, the system for access was recognized as working, as approxi-
mately one million accessions were exchanged. However, some member countries have assigned very few ac-
cessions to the system.2 There has been a process to expand the number of species covered by the MLS, but at the
Governing Body (GB) in Rome 2019 these talks were suspended.
The fund has received voluntary payments3 from countries and some private companies, like Nenhems Neth-
erlands b.v., which paid USD 119,083 to the Fund. As yet, the Fund has not received substantial payments through
the mandatory “benefit‐sharing” provisions of the Treaty. This article explores whether weaknesses in the SMTA in
perspective of contract law can explain this lack of mandatory payments. In turn, the findings will be used as basis for
suggesting improvements so that the MLS may better contribute to the livelihoods of poor farmers through the Fund.
2 | THE ACCESS PERSPECTIVE: INCLUSION IN THE MULTILATERAL
SYSTEM
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has long had a focus on access to plant genetic resources, also before
the ITPGRFA came into existence. Early versions of the International Undertaking focused on access, and did not
mention benefit sharing. This emphasis on access was also expressed in Section 4 of Resolution 3 from the 1992
Nairobi Conference when the Convention on Biological Diversity was adapted:
4. Further recognizes the need to seek solutions to outstanding matters concerning plant genetic
resources within the Global System for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Sustainable Agriculture, in particular: (a) Access to ex‐situ collections not
acquired in accordance with this Convention; and (b) The question of farmers' rights.
84 | TVEDT
Resolution 3 speaks of “access”: the term “benefit sharing” does not appear in the text. Initially, the aim of the
ITPGRFA was to address specific needs concerning access to the international gene bank collections of plant
accessions for breeding as one outstanding issue, because of the “special features of plant genetic resources”.4
Visser (2013, pp. 274–276) notes that the gene banks “formed a major element of the discussions”; moreover, that
disagreements over the list in the Annex “revealed deep political divides” (Visser, 2013, p. 272). Regulating
collections was regarded as a complex issue due to difficulties in identifying the “country of origin” (as defined by
the convention on biological diversity [CBD]) for the accessions in collections (Andersen, 2001).
The MLS for access is limited to the species listed in Annex I to the Plant Treaty, with three criteria concerning the
legal status “under the management and control of the Contracting Parties and in the public domain”.5 This considerably
restricts the scope of obligatory inclusion in the MLS. Accessions held by famers are not mandatorily covered by the MLS,
although there is a movement toward collecting and including such accessions under the “management and control” of
public institutions in MLS member‐countries. When seed samples from rural farmers are being managed and under the
control of public collections, they are one long step closer to be mandatorily accessible under the Multinational System.
The last criteria for farmers seeds becoming accessible in the MLS is a declaration of their legal status. The question is
whether national law consider them as in the “public domain” or not. There has been considerable disagreement as to
what “public domain”means in this context (see, e.g., Tvedt, 2015, pp. 8–12, with further references to the debate). When
seeds from farmers is being collected, the rights of the farmers to their germplasm need to be specified. If the legal status
of farmers material is not specified their property rights risk becoming eroded when seed is made globally accessible
under the MLS. Clear and specific terms and rights retained by farmers' material after collection increases the chance of
avoiding them loosing rights in a case where these farmers' accessions are being used in further plant breeding. The SMTA
does not include any clauses securing the farmers' rights to the material when it is included under the MLS.
Clarifying the terms on which farmers deposit their material and specifying that collection does not mean that it
is under a “public domain” will be legal decisive for being able to benefit from the material in the long term. A future
expansion of the accessions mandatorily included in the MLS beyond the “public domain”—criterion will entail a
challenge to maintaining the rights of farmers. This important perspective on the rights of farmers and peasants to
their germplasm has been largely neglected in the debate on and theoretical discourse of “Farmers' Rights.” If the
scope of mandatory inclusion in the MLS is expanded in this manner, that will probably require renegotiation of the
Plant Treaty, and invoking the amendment procedure of the ITPGRFA. Thus, rights of the farmers who contribute to
the MLS is a topic that the Plant Treaty will need to clarify if it is to serve the realization of “Farmers' Rights.”
The CGIAR system handles accessions of species that are not mandatorily included in the MLS. To a large
extent, the CGIAR also applies the SMTA to many of accessions not mandatory covered by the MLS. In fact, this
expands the use of the SMTA to samples not mandatory under the scope of the open access system.
3 | CALLS FOR CHANGES
The focus on access and the current failure to meet expectations regarding the mandatory monetary contribution
to the MLS has led countries to call for a revision of the SMTA and the MLS.
The Plant Treaty established an Ad Hoc Technical Advisory Committee on the MLS and the SMTA, which
worked until 2013, without dealing with the contract‐law challenges. The Fifth Session of the GB mandated a new
ad hoc working group to “develop a range of measures for consideration and decision,” inter alia to:
(a) Increase user‐based payments and contributions to the benefit‐sharing fund in a sustainable and
predictable long‐term manner, and
(b) Enhance the functioning of the MLS by additional measures.6
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Global recognition of the need for increased user‐based payments and for enhancement of the functionality of
the MLS7 formed the background for Resolution 2/2013 and 1/2015 of respectively the Fifth and the Sixth
Sessions of the GB. These decisions requested the Ad Hoc Open‐Ended Working Group to Enhance the
Functioning of the MLS of Access and Benefit‐sharing to, inter alia:
… invite written inputs or reports from all relevant stakeholders where needed and/or to establish
small ad hoc Friends of the Co‐Chairs groups, where needed, e.g. on user categories, on crop
categories, on legal modalities, on payment rates, and on a termination clause, at the request of the
Working Group or its Co‐Chairs; the small ad hoc friends of the Co‐Chairs groups would be re-
quested to provide written input to the Co‐chairs8
However, negotiations on the revision of the MLS broke down at the GB in Rome 2019: “The Governing
Body could not, at this Session, reach consensus on measures to enhance the functioning of the
Multilateral System.”9 The GB‐8 was unable to reach agreement concerning a formal intersessional process
on the MLS.
Divergent views on how to draft a new wording have divided governments. Here the issue of the digital use of
plant genetic resources, the details of the SMTA and the manner of expanding the mandatory scope of the species
to be included in the MLS seem to be among the major points causing the deadlock. In hopes of bringing the
negotiations further, this article offers a contract‐law analysis of the current SMTA, indicating outstanding topics
to be developed in a new round of negotiations.
4 | EXPLORING THE SMTA AS A CONTRACT
This article explores the SMTA as a contract. It investigates ways of expressing the obligations in the wording,
unclear trigger‐points, lack of remedies against breach of contract and limited enforcement mechanisms can
explain lack of user payment, drawing on contract‐law research to outline possible ways toward to an improved
SMTA. The main aim is to contribute to a future improved, second‐generation SMTA, noting current obstacles, to
enable fruitful proposals for revising the SMTA so it can function better as a contract, thereby contributing more to
the objectives of the ITPGRFA. (See also Louafi & Bhatti, 2013, p. 194).
The FAO declares, on the webpage of the Plant Treaty:
The Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA) is a private contract with standard terms and
conditions that ensures that the relevant provisions of the International Treaty are followed by
individual providers and recipients of plant genetic material.10
This article explores how the SMTA might ensure compliance by recipients of plant genetic material to the
provisions of the Plant Treaty, in particular in respect of the mandatory monetary user payments.11 The premise
for the research question is to explore the SMTA as a contract.
A core question is whether the “standard terms and conditions” have the contract‐law potential to ensure
that individual recipients adhere to the relevant provisions of the International Treaty, which the SMTA
has set as its objective. This question will be approached by applying contract law to the SMTA and
discussing its contractual functionality. In assessing whether the SMTA could serve as a model for the
drafting of new contracts, Young and Tvedt (2017) conclude that it does not serve as a good example of a
functional contract
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5 | USING A CONTRACT TO IMPLEMENT INTERNATIONAL LAW
5.1 | Fundamental differences between international law and contract law
International public law, including the ITPGRFA, is binding on states but has no legally binding effect on private
companies. Access and benefit‐sharing (ABS), under the ITPGRFA and the CBD, is aimed at altering the actions of
private users and companies. Rules in international law are not directly binding on private companies; they must be
transferred into binding obligations on the companies. Using a standard contract is therefore an adequate legal
tool for binding private companies to detailed obligations.
Any contract is interpreted and enforced under contract law in the country in which any of its parties operates.
As the SMTA calls itself a contract and is intended to establish obligations that are legally binding on the user, it
must be able to function in a contract‐legal landscape, by being binding, promoting compliance and being enforceable.
The SMTA uses the term “agreement” in the heading. Contract–law terminology uses the terms “agreement” and
“contract,” without necessarily implying any legal distinctions. Here I prefer the term “contract.”
The SMTA sets legally binding obligations on all the users that have signed on to it. In this article, I explore the
content of the current text of the SMTA, identifying the current contractually binding and enforceable obligations,
and indicating some options for the future regarding how to make the SMTA a more legally binding document.
5.2 | A change in terminology: From “benefit‐sharing” to “user payment”
Increasingly, the term “user payment” is used instead of the generic term “benefit sharing” in connection with the
SMTA and the MLS. Commercial corporations constitute the typical user expected to pay into the fund. Before a
commercial user becomes obliged to pay, the expectations set out in the SMTA must become legally binding
contractual obligations. As a primary objective of corporations is to create economic surplus to their shareholders,
a company is not entitled to pay parts of its turnover unless obliged to do so. Except for corporate social
responsibility schemes, it is generally contrary to corporate law to “share the benefits created by the company”
unless the company is contractually obliged to pay. Thus, if the SMTA does not establish contractually binding
obligations on a company, any payment or sharing of benefits might breach the law of the user country.
A corporation has no legal competence to share parts of its value‐creation with anyone else than its shareholders.
5.3 | Major challenges for a contract to regulate both access and benefit sharing
There are several obstacles for contracts in general to be used as the main legal tool for making access and benefit
sharing work on the ground. One major challenge in making a contract work for both access and for benefit sharing
is the time‐lag between the act of obtaining the material and the point of payment or sharing of any results. Unlike
most conventional contracts, the two transactions in an ABS contract rarely take place at the same time. First, the
user gains access to the material, without any up‐front payments being foreseen. Time passes; and then, if the
venture proves successful, a product is finally put in the market, is sold and generates revenue. Contractually, this
gives rise to numerous challenges.
At this point, the user is the only one who can provide evidence for the link between a genetic resource—
accession of a plant seed—and a product in the market. The provider has fulfilled all his obligations under the
contract up‐front; the users/recipients have got all they want, in exchange for a latent contractual obligation to be
fulfilled in the future. The imbalance in time between the performance of the respective obligations implies a risk:
the latter performance might not be fulfilled. Thus, it is essential that the contractual obligations be clear, specific
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and easily monitored—to be binding, encourage compliance and be possible to enforce. Also for a compliant user, the
existence of clear and specific obligations will increase compliance.
The analysis here will not dwell much on rules on the provider side, focusing instead on obligations on the
user side.
6 | TRIGGER‐POINT FOR OBLIGATIONS
6.1 | Exploring current trigger‐points: Do they meet the criteria “clear and specific”?
A major challenge for making benefit‐sharing obligations work involves the fact that the user receives accessions of
plant seeds, but sells something different in the market, often a new plant variety. There is no identity between the
subject matters received and what triggers the payment obligations (Tvedt et al., 2016, pp. 3–4). The SMTA reflects
this by using the two terms “material” (defining the input) and “product that is a PGRFA that incorporates the
Material” (defining the trigger for sharing).
A core challenge in contract drafting is to define the trigger‐points for an obligation in a manner that is clear,
specific, binding, and enforceable. The wording of a contact is per se binding. The choice of terms and the wording
may indicate differing degrees of bindingness in the language: vague or unspecific wording may reduce the level of
bindingness. This is well‐known from international law, where the use of qualifying terms like “reasonable” or “as
appropriate” will dilute the bindingness of any obligation. Moreover, there are many commonly used words with no
fixed, universally totally agreed reference in the physical world—take “boat,” for instance. While there is agreement
on subsuming some types of floating devices under this term, there will be uncertainty in certain grey zones: for
instance, is a kayak a boat? In a technological area like plant breeding that applies a range of new techniques, the
uncertain zone of words and criteria used as triggers for obligations will tend to be grayer and greater. In turn,
vague contract wording gives rise to complex questions concerning interpretation and practical application.
The idea is to hold the wording of the SMTA to these virtues in legal language, and identify the extent to which
they are met.
6.1.1 | “Genetic material” as a legal term
One core term of the SMTA is “genetic material.” It is the basis for the definition of Plant Genetic Resources for
Food and Agriculture, and therefore defines the scope of several articles and obligations.:
‘Genetic material’ means any material of plant origin, including reproductive and vegetative propa-
gating material, containing functional units of heredity.
The core limiting wording in this definition is “any material,” a word “material” that has a range of meanings.
One understanding is “a physical substance that things can be made from.”12 This notion of the term leads the
associations in direction of the physical plant material. The focus in the FAO on the accessions in the collections
underscores this understanding.
A complementing definition of “material” is “information used when writing something such as a book.”13 Here
the understanding of the term connotes to nonphysical input to creative activity. One reason why the discussions
at the GB 8 in Rome ended was because of disagreement on whether digital sequences data that include genes in a
computer format are covered by the scope of the Plant Treaty. The definition “genetic material” here showed to be
an ambiguous term that could pave the way to agreeing to the treaty in 2001, but that, when pinning down the
more detailed and binding rules, countries argued opposing interpretation of the same word. In contracts failure to
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agree on the specific content on core terms will make the obligations impossible to determine, comply to and in last
resort to enforce (Young & Tvedt, 2017, Ch. 5).
Let us now contrast the ambiguous term “genetic material” with the most recent contract‐law analysis in the
ABS area. In the ABS Contract Tool it is suggested that the description of plants when subject matter to an ABS
contract should be defined in rather specific and detailed language, while at the same time seeking to encompass
all elements of plants that can be used in biotechnology and similar fields.
A plant sample [includes/covers/reaches on to] any seeds or propagating or multiplication material of any kind.
A plant sample includes/covers any part of plant:
a) the vegetative material, including leaves, roots, straw, flowers, fruits, or any other, including but not limited, to any
extract in any form.
b) the entire bioactive [elements/compounds] or organic composition (molecules, amino acids, proteins, lipids,
glucides, [enzymes] or any other bioactive element in or [isolated/generated] from the vegetative material.
c) every subcell element/part, including DNA, RNA, or any other element carrying genetic information.
A sample covers any information in the material, or which is extracted from it by any method, or genetic information in
any format, or data generated therefrom, including but not limited to genetic information, biochemical content, or
bioactive, or any other information in or extracted or analyzed from the samples.
A sample also includes any micro‐organisms in or on the plant, including but not limited to parasites or pathogens on or
in the plant material.
This proposal is developed by the author in collaboration with a number of experts. The reason for proposing a
detailed, specific, comprehensive, but at the same time not narrow, definition is for it to cover any relevant
“material,” physical or nonphysical, related to the activities relevant for the user. The wording indicated in the
boxed text will lead to far less potential disagreement than the ambiguous term. The lack of precision and
specificity in the trigger in the SMTA reduces the precision in the obligation.
The definition of “plant genetic resources for food and agriculture” (PGRFA) is based on the definition of
“genetic material.” The ambiguity in the core term extends to the other legal concepts that build on the
core term.
The concept of PGRFA is confined to “material of plant origin,” as spelled out in Article 3, on the subject
matter of the SMTA. This might imply that any methods or nonmaterial uses of plant DNA, genetic information
or related subject matters are contractually defined as not covered by (or regulated by) the SMTA. But if the
second linguistic understanding of “material” is applied, these less physical subject matters are brought under
the definition.
When used in the operative articles, the first definition leads to a narrow scope for the obligations, whereas
the contrast between the first and the second understanding creates ambiguity.
6.1.2 | “Product” as the trigger
Closely linked to the definition of “genetic material” is the definition of the core term “Product.” The definition of
Product is central in defining the trigger‐point for benefit sharing:
“Product” means Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture that incorporate the Material or any
of its genetic parts or components that are ready for commercialization, excluding commodities and
other products used for food, feed and processing. (SMTA Art 2.)
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Combining these definitions, “Product” means
any [material of plant origin, including reproductive and vegetative propagating material, containing
functional units of heredity] of plant origin of actual or potential value for food and agriculture that
incorporate the Material or any of its genetic parts or components that are ready for commercia-
lization, excluding commodities and other products used for food, feed and processing. (SMTA
Art 2.)
The definition of “Product” contains two references to “material.” With the first understanding of “material,”
the wording indicates that products that trigger the payment obligations are linked to physical plant material. The
term “incorporates the material” could be read narrowly if it concerns only products that are material, and excludes
immaterial methods or informational aspects. With the second understanding, the scope of obligation loses pre-
cision, but gains a broader scope.
If we take a broader look at which products that are meant to capture benefit sharing under the SMTA, this
wording emerges as far from certain for a contractual obligation, as it leaves room for interpretation.
The most typical product that incorporates the material is “plant varieties.” However, under today's benefit‐
sharing obligation, the plant varieties protected by plant breeders' rights are left outside the mandatory benefit‐
sharing obligation. Which products remain to be covered when the core defining term is that the physical material
must be “incorporat[ed]”? The term “incorporated” leaves room for a certain margin of interpretation, or un-
specificity. When interpreted in conjunction, it means that the benefit‐sharing obligation applies only to seeds that
are in a physical relationship to accessions from the MLS. With its emphasis on the physical material, this definition
leaves all digital or synthetic products and virtually all methods in plant breeding outside the scope of the benefit‐
sharing obligation. Moreover, the term “incorporates” indicates that other uses than breeding or genetic in-
troduction into the new material fall outside the scope of the trigger‐obligation.
The core definitions render the scope of the obligation narrow, but not specific. The narrowness of the defi-
nitions reduces the number of products that will generate benefits to be shared. It is not easy to imagine clear
instances, other than a new plant variety, that would trigger this benefit‐sharing obligation from a technical legal
point of view. In addition to being narrow, the manner in which the trigger‐point is constructed linguistically,
depending on two definitions, introduces a lack of specificity which in turn makes it challenging for a judge to
decide when the obligation is triggered. If the MLS and SMTA were intended only to trigger benefit sharing from
new plant varieties and no other products, then the wording would gain in legal certainty if clearer terms
were used.
Detailed interpretation of the substantive obligations in the SMTA hinges on the definitions of core concepts in
its Article 2. Unless the definition is tailor‐made to the specific substantive obligation, the scope of the obligation
might end up not being as expected. In contract drafting, it is always best to draft obligations as specifically and
clearly as possible, leaving minimal room for interpretation, but avoiding wording that makes the obligations
unnecessarily narrow in scope.
6.1.3 | Proposing solutions
If the process for reviewing the SMTA can manage to get back on track, it will be necessary to revisit the
definitions of the trigger‐points (“Product that is a Plant Genetic Resource for Food and Agriculture and that
incorporates Material”), so as to enable the SMTA to be enforced as a contract. One challenge facing the future
work is to make the language of the obligation sufficiently clear for any reader of the SMTA to grasp when the
benefit‐sharing obligation kicks in.
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If the intention had been to capture sales of plant varieties only, the wording of the SMTA would have
provided an obligation that was easier to comply with and far more enforceable if a narrow, definite trigger‐point
had been specified. If the intention had been to capture any unforeseeable research results in the future, a more
detailed list would have reduced the uncertainty. It would also have become narrower, but that could be dealt with
by including a listing in combination with “not limited to.”
One solution, presented here, would be to specify in detail the products or processes that trigger payment
obligations with commercialization. Trigger‐points for benefit sharing can be defined as the physical material itself,
and the next generations of these physical accession. From this there is a continuity of material in development:
much of the material in public collections and in commercial companies is in the process of being developed towards
products. Further trigger‐points: digital expressions of the DNA or scanned genomes of plants and synthetic use of
these digital expressions as long‐standing valuable assets in plant breeding; and end‐products in plant breeding
protected by plant breeders' rights or registered as plant varieties registered in the system of seed laws. (Here it
should be noted that, in a few countries, a plant variety may be protected by the patent system. See, for example, the
EU Patent Directive 44/98 Article 4) Finally: patents on inventions targeting other subject matters—for example,
parts of the DNA, parts of the gene, or specific properties of the plant.
The definitions in the SMTA are unspecific but narrow, in turn leaving the payment obligation undefined but
narrow. Each of these results of the use discussed above here would raise different political challenges in being
included as triggering payment obligations. It should be noted that future discussions on the SMTA, as other
political negotiations regarding digital aspects of genetic resources, run the risk of not reaching agreement ending
in a political deadlock.
7 | LOOPHOLES OF THE SMTA: ALLOWING SPECIFIC USES AND
PROHIBITING OTHERS
7.1 | Loopholes in the current SMTA
Article 6 of the SMTA emplaces rights and obligations on the recipient. The first obligation targets the legal uses of
the material:
6.1 The Recipient undertakes that the Material shall be used or conserved only for the purposes of
research, breeding and training for food and agriculture. Such purposes shall not include chemical,
pharmaceutical and/or other non‐food/feed industrial uses.
Legal uses are research, breeding and training. In contract language, the term “and” normally implies that
both/all the criteria on each side of the “and” must be present for an obligation to kick in. In this case, the three
alternatives must be understood as alternative manners to use the material.
However, there are activities that do not fall within the allowed activities or the excluded ones. In a contract,
that destroys the chances of compliance and/or enforcement. How would a judge decide whether a not‐listed
activity is within or outside of these obligations?
Moreover, such wording probably does not permit, say, a farmer who does not conduct breeding or research
on the material, but simply wants to multiply and grow the material, the right to get accessions from the MLS. In
terms of realizing Farmers' Rights, this is highly problematic. Seeds are collected from farmers and included in the
MLS—but farmers have no clear right to access to material from others. If the Plant Treaty is to improve the
implementation of Farmers Rights, substantive rights in the MLS must be recognized as a core building block.
The term “breeding” is specific, and relates to the overall aim of the MLS: to make accessions available for the
breeding of new plant varieties. The term “research” is broader, indicating many more activities than those legally
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covered by specific breeding. Relevant here is the qualifier “for food and agriculture”: research for purposes other
than food and agriculture is not legal, according to the SMTA. However, the broad term “agriculture” is not
sufficiently specific.
The final sentence of Art. 6.1 is most problematic from a contract perspective: “Such purposes shall not include
chemical, pharmaceutical and/or other nonfood/feed industrial uses.” Here the SMTA seeks to limit the legal uses
of the material under the MLS.
But what happens if the user applies the material for purposes other than research, breeding or training?
That is illegal under the SMTA—but nothing is said about the consequences in case of infringement or breach
of contract. For the sake of clarity as to contractual obligations the SMTA will need to specify what the User is
required to do in case of nonauthorized uses—whether this is beyond the specific legal uses or “chemical,
pharmaceutical and/or other nonfood/feed industrial uses.” Currently, any breach of these limits to what is
authorized becomes almost impossible to enforce, as there is nothing in the contract itself on the con-
sequences of breach of the SMTA. One rationale underlying the MLS is that it shall not possible to identify the
country of origin of the accession—but that means there will not be a counterpart to an ABS contract for uses
not authorized by the SMTA.
When then would be the legally correct approach if a user intends to undertake other activities? In brief: as
access to the material is exempt from the general ABS system according to the Nagoya Protocol under the CBD
Art. 4, and the collections are not mandated to enter into individually negotiated contracts regulating these uses of
the material, there exists no way of providing legal access for such purposes. It is here that the SMTA creates the
largest loophole in the ABS system. This becomes particularly problematic if the material is used in digital and
synthetic manners: The only way to get access to the material is by using the SMTA. Such uses are not legal under
the SMTA, but no sanctions for breaching these limits are specified. Moreover, as any uses beyond “research,
breeding and training for food and agriculture” are not legal under the SMTA, such uses would never trigger the
benefit‐sharing obligations.
7.2 | Possible solutions
A new SMTA should include two aspects: (1) a procedure for Users seeking access for the nonlegal uses according
to the SMAT; and (2) remedies for dealing with noncompliant users. One approach is to specifically regulate the
legal consequences of breaches. This includes specifying clear consequences for access for non‐ or nonagriculture
access or food purpose chemical or industrial uses these purposes.
An example of alternative formulations could be:
In the case where the Recipient undertakes screening, scanning or any other research on the genetic
information, data, or knowledge, then the Recipient shall [specify the consequences].
In the case where the Recipient embarks on any activities that are not research, breeding or training
for food and agriculture, the Recipient shall enter into an ABS contract with the Country of Origin of
Material. The collection from where access is sought must have a system in place for granting such
access. If it not possible to identify the Country of Origin, the agreement shall be made with [choose
and insert an institution that can administer these situastion] and the benefits shall be shared in the
mechanisms of NP Art. 10.
To facilitate access also for such purposes, one approach for the parties to the ITPGRFA and the CBD is to use
the mechanisms in Nagoya Protocol (NP) Art. 19 and 20 to create standard ABS Contracts that the collection can
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require be used. To follow the standard‐contract approach of the MLS, such a mutually supportive supplementing
contract could be developed.
8 | ATTEMPTS TO PROHIBIT A USER FROM APPLYING FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPRS)
8.1 | Can a contract limit the right to claim IPRs?
The SMTAs establishes a rule on the relationship to the right to apply for intellectual property rights:
6.2 The Recipient shall not claim any intellectual property or other rights that limit the facilitated
access to the Material provided under this Agreement, or its genetic parts or components, in the form
received from the Multilateral System.
Parallel wording is found in the Plant Treaty Article 12.3.d. Generally, ABS Contracts have tended to seek to
prohibit any IPRs on the material exchanged. In ABS, as spelled out in the CBD and Nagoya Protocol, many
contracts have included similar language seeking to establish contractual limitations to the use of the patent, so
there is broad academic experience regarding the success of such a clause.
The first observation is that the grant of a patent or plant breeder's right is a statutory competence of the
Patent Office of each nation (or regional office). The competence of a public administrative (statutory) body cannot
be limited by any private law contract in constitutional systems. The patent office assessment of whether to grant a
patent depends merely on whether the patent applicant describes his invention in a manner that meets the patent
criteria. The patent office does not assess whether the application infringes any contractual obligations pre‐grant
of the patent. Moreover, patent systems do not open for such an assessment in the post‐grant phase. Breach of
contract is not a relevant reason for rejecting a patent application. Thus, the obligation according to Art 6.2 will not
have legal effect for patent offices, neither will the longstanding discussion in the World Intellectual Property Right
Organization (WIPO) regarding disclosure of origin of material render this obligation functional.
The only subject of the obligation is the Recipient of the Material: the wording of the obligation indicates a
clear and specific obligation on the user. The contractual obligation according to Article 6.2 does not alter the right
that of the Recipient of MLS material has as an inventor to apply for a patent. Breach of this contract‐clause could
never have any legal effect for the validity of the patent, although breach of the obligation might have contractual
consequences. Moreover, the SMTA does not establish any remedies, nor stipulate any legal consequences of a
breach. In contract law, this means that this obligation cannot be enforced. The clear wording gives a false
impression for member states that the Users of the MLS can effectively be prevented from patenting material from
the MSL. Article 8 sets out the mechanism for dealing with breach of this clause, including the activities of the
“third party beneficiary.”
The second observation regarding today's SMTA concerns the scope of the obligation. The wording restricts
only the patenting of “Material provided under this Agreement, or its genetic parts or components, in the form
received.” However, patent claims are almost never formulated in a manner as qualify as “material” as defined in
SMTA Article 2. The prohibition extends to “its genetic parts or components […] in the form received.” Linguis-
tically, the wording gives the impression of a broad prohibition, focusing on parts of the material received. The
wording “in the form received” implies a narrow obligation on the recipient, as a patent claim is almost never
identical to accession of seeds as received from the MLS. This limitation makes more legal sense in respect of
limiting the right to register a new plant variety that is almost identical to the accession received through the MLS.
In countries where legislation on plant breeders' rights operates with a low requirement for novelty and accepting
the registration of a plant variety which has not been registered before, seeking protection of material obtained
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directly from the MLS would not imply a breach of contract. The wording gives a non‐patent‐lawyer the impression
of a functional limitation. Countries fought hard to get this wording included in the SMTA, although it is hardly
enforceable from a contract‐law perspective.
The only way to challenge legally a breach of Art. 6.2 in the SMAT would be by claiming reparation or damages
from the breach of this obligation. This raises contractual‐legal obstacles, as it would be difficult to prove that the
MLS had suffered damages in the case of an illegal patent or plant variety protection.
8.2 | Outlining solutions to the relationship with IPRs
There are no obvious solutions for preventing or prohibiting the Recipient from applying for a patent. A better
contractual solution would be to change the trigger‐point for benefit sharing to use patenting or registration of a
plant breeders' right. However, that would involve problems in identifying when a patent or plant breeders' right
are related to Material from the MLS. Including special language in the SMTA could help to bridge this difficult gap
in identifying the material used in an invention.
When a patented invention is developed under special conditions, a revised SMTA could specify certain
obligations (Tvedt & Rukundo, 2019). In the United States, when the government or public funds are used for
research, and results are patented, a contractual obligation enters in. The patent applicant is required to introduce
a text‐box on the cover page of the patent application, clearly stating that the U.S. government retains certain
limited rights to the research leading to the patented invention:
This is based on a formulation frequently used in patent applications where the U.S. government enjoys a
limited right. Perhaps the MLS and SMTA could require the inclusion of such an obligation, to secure their
contractual rights.
9 | FROM “BENEFIT ‐SHARING” TO “USER PAYMENT”?
9.1 | The trigger‐point for benefit sharing in the current SMTA
Whether a product in the marked triggers the benefit‐sharing obligation, or not, depends on the definition of the
trigger points set out in the SMTA:
6.7 In the case that the Recipient commercializes a Product that is a Plant Genetic Resource for
Food and Agriculture and that incorporates Material as referred to in Article 3 of this Agreement,
and where such Product is not available without restriction to others for further research and
breeding […]
According to the current SMTA, the activity that triggers benefit sharing “commercializes a product” that “is a
PGRFA” and “incorporates Material” from the MLS. The wording here refers back to the definitions in Article 2;
interpretation of its exact legal content is a tricky exercise that requires reading several articles in conjunction. The
trigger‐action is “commercializes,” as defined in Article 2:
The user shall place the following statement in any Patent Application it files on any Subject Invention related to
any material or knowledge developed enabled by it: ‘This invention was created in the performance of a [Name
of this contract/Cooperative Research and Development Agreement] with the [National Institutes of [NAME OF
THE PARTNER IN THE PROVIDER COUNTRY]]. The MLS of the Plant Treaty has certain rights in this invention.’
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“To commercialize” means to sell a Product or Products for monetary consideration on the open
market, and “commercialization” has a corresponding meaning. Commercialization shall not include
any form of transfer of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture under Development.
The trigger‐action is defined solely as selling for money, on the open market. As “to sell” is normally under-
stood as “[g]ive or hand over (something) in exchange for money,”14 this excludes licensing where nothing is
handed over. Also excluded is payment for limited rights. The triggering action is narrowly defined.
In view of the ongoing process aimed at improving the functionality of the MLS it is useful to note the wording
of trigger‐points for rights in other regimes. In the CBD and Nagoya Protocol, the term used as trigger‐point for
benefit sharing is “utilization of genetic resources.” This is an unspecific but all‐inclusive (comprehensive) trigger
activity. In patent law, the trigger‐points for payment to the patent holder are defined as: “making, using, offering
for sale, selling, or importing” (TRIPS Art. 28.1.a). The patent‐law triggers are far more detailed and specific,
without being overly narrow.
The next limiting factor of the trigger‐point concerns “Product that is a Plant Genetic Resource for Food and
Agriculture and that incorporates Material.” This part of the wording is complex, in turn opening for varying
interpretations, and introducing unpredictability, especially in judiciary enforcement.
“Product” means Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture that incorporate the Material or
any of its genetic parts or components that are ready for commercialization, excluding commodities
and other products used for food, feed and processing.
The wording of Article 6.7 includes limiting criteria that define the trigger‐point. The first concerns what is
meant by “Product that is a PGRFA.” This core trigger‐point was discussed in Section 6 above, in light of the
definitions in SMTA Article 2. Both “product” and “PGRFA” refer to material. This means that nonmaterial subject
matters do not trigger benefit‐sharing, and narrows the product developed from accessions gotten from the MLS.
The next limiting item in the trigger‐point is the requirement that the product shall incorporate material.
Again, the focuses is on physical seeds. The term “incorporates” refers to the inclusion of something physical into
something else, without specifying the level of dependence that is required. The level of incorporation is uncertain,
with very few sources for interpreting it. There are also considerable challenges of evidence in applying this
criterion.
Most countries include an exception from patent protection in their patent acts for plant varieties. If the
patent holder sells seeds that are developed from applying the method, then the product is a PGRFA and in-
corporates parts of the material received from the MLS. This illustrates the narrowness of the trigger‐point: If the
method for breeding is licensed out, it is no obligation to share benefits; this obligation applies only when the
recipient of the material from the system commercializes seeds. The combination of the SMTA and the patent
system renders the mandatory obligation of benefit sharing narrow indeed.
The wording excludes a benefit‐sharing obligation from synthetic use of the DNA. Further, it excludes any
application of gene‐editing techniques applied to plants, as material from the MLS is not incorporated in such cases
(often referred to as CRISPR).
The pass‐on obligation in Art. 6.10 applies when the invention concerns “any Products developed from the
Material or its components.” The obligation to pass on the SMTA is limited by the definitions discussed above: thus,
the pass‐on obligation does not constitute a trigger.
The subject matter of ABS in general is “genetic resources”; despite for all its vagueness, it is far more
interpretable than the complex wording presented above. In patent law, the subject matter is flexible, and is easier
to tailor‐make than in a standard contract. The question for reflection in reviewing and redrafting the SMTA is
thus: Why does not the Plant Treaty learn from these two other international instruments, but instead insists on
retaining highly complex wording but narrowly delimited trigger points for the benefit‐sharing obligation?
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10 | WHAT HAPPENS IN CASE OF INFRINGEMENT?
10.1 | Lack of remedies
In contract law, specifying the remedies in case of breach of contract is essential, to make a contract legally binding
and enforceable. As the essence to the classic British legal scholar Blackstone expressing that for every legal right,
there is a remedy: where there is no remedy, there is no right.
The SMTA makes no mention of any remedies that apply in case of infringement or breach of the contract. This
means that the SMTA establishes no rights for the provider and no obligations on the commercial users. This is not
suggested for inclusion in the draft.
SMTA Article 7 on applicable law refers to “General Principles of Law, including the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts 2004.”15 However, the UNIDROIT Principles are not binding and have no
legally binding effect, as they represent an attempt to establish general contractual principles, but without binding
effect as “law.” The wording in Article 7 does not provide any remedies for breach of contractual obligations in
the SMTA.
Further legal sources for the SMTA are “the objectives and the relevant provisions of the Treaty, and, when
necessary for interpretation.” These sources are binding on Parties to the ITPGRFA, with no binding effect on
private parties. How, then, could public international law become relevant sources of interpretation of a contract?
Moreover, it is not possible to see how a general treaty can give guidance to the interpretation of a private law
contract.
The final reference, to “the decision of the Governing Body,” is also a peculiar one in contract law. It means that
a source for the interpretation of private law obligations shall be dependent on nonbinding decision from an
international body. However, it seems highly dubious that a court would accept such a dynamic source for the
interpretation of a contractual obligation: The clause renders questions of the contract to decisions on which the
parties of the contract have no influence—and courts will be reluctant to draw legally binding interpretations and
solutions from such a mechanism. This wording has an element of retroactive effect for amendments of the
contract, which is problematic under most contract laws. In conclusion, the current SMTA offers no contractual
rules that stipulate reactions or remedies in case of breach.
10.2 | Enforcing the SMTA: The recipient, collection, and the third‐party beneficiary
One generally overlooked question in ABS contracts: Who are the parties to the contract, the SMTA? (see Young &
Tvedt, 2017, Ch. 3.) In contract law, it is only the parties to a contract that are bound by its obligations. Today there
is a discrepancy between the contractual parties to the SMTA: On the one side, there is the User, who will have a
strong interest in there being no obligations. On the other side there is a public collection as the Provider. Any user
payment goes, not to the providing collection, but to the Benefit‐sharing Fund of the Plant Treaty. Normally, both
parties to a contract have a strong interest in compliance, but the collection as such has no economic interest in
enforcing user payment—an atypical contractual relationship indeed. In a narrow economic sense, no parties to the
SMTA have any interest in ensuring compliance with the benefit‐sharing obligation.
The Third‐Party Beneficiary is established to act on behalf of the contract party on the provider side. However,
the Third‐Party Beneficiary is set as being the FAO. Here we have an interesting situation: a UN specialized agency
is granted competence to act as a counterpart to and take legal steps against a private corporation in one of the
UN member countries. This is not found in any other UN agencies or organizations, and there are considerable
obstacles. First, the FAO, as a specialized agency under the UN, has no direct interest in enforcing the contractual
obligation, as payment does not accrue to the organization itself. Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that a UN
agency or organization would take legal action against a private corporation. If the FAO should engage in such
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enforcement of a private contract, it would probably be met with the requirement to maintain its neutrality. It is
therefore very difficult to see how this system could lead to compliance, despite the formal competences given to
the Third‐Party Beneficiary.
The Third‐Party Beneficiary system makes compliance with the SMTA a decision that the user can take
without any likely legal consequences in case of noncompliance. To be contractually functional, a new SMTA will
need to take into account two points: how to oblige the party who is going to create the benefits; and to establish a
party to the contract with potential to enforce it. Otherwise, a new SMTA cannot be expected to increase the flow
of benefits to the Benefit‐sharing Fund.
11 | IS THE SMTA REALLY A CONTRACT?
The SMTA calls itself an agreement, and there are indeed some elements that resemble a contract. However,
calling something a contract does not make that document an enforceable contract in and of itself. For a text to
have private‐law effects, it must not be void as assessed in terms of contract law; it must describe legally binding
obligations; and it must be enforceable.
The GB of the ITPGRFA mandated the Ad Hoc Open‐Ended Working Group to Enhance the Functioning of the
Multilateral System to work to increase the functionality of the MLS. One step in this direction involves amending
the SMTA. However, drafting a contract is a legal skill in which not all lawyers are trained. As has become evident
in the case of the current SMTA, negotiating a contract in a group of diplomats, few of them contract lawyers, does
not necessarily produce a functional result.
If the GB intends to establish legally binding obligations on users of material from the MLS, the text of the
SMTA must be revised so as to become valid, binding and enforceable as a contract. Otherwise, a revised SMTA will
continue providing monetary benefits as limited as under the current one; and in 10 or 15 years, the Parties to the
Plant Treaty will again be asking why there have been so few user payments into the Fund. And here, the answer is
obvious: If a company is not contractually obliged to pay anything, it cannot be expected to do so voluntarily.
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ENDNOTES
1PGRFA are defined as “any genetic material of plant origin of actual or potential value for food and agriculture (Art. 2).”
2For example, France has designated only 719 accessions; http://www.fao.org/plant-treaty/areas-of-work/the-
multilateral-system/collections/en/ (accessed November 5, 2018).
3Norway was the first country to donate to the fund and has been doing so for the four first calls for projects, http://www.
fao.org/plant-treaty/areas-of-work/benefit-sharing-fund/projects-funded/en/.
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4On the negotiations that led to the Plant Treaty and the difficult political challenges encountered along the way, see
Andersen (2008, pp. 87–115).
5Views differ fundamentally on interpretations of these criteria. See Tvedt (2015), and compare with Halewood et al.
(2013) and Correa (2013).
6http://www.fao.org/plant-treaty/areas-of-work/the-multilateral-system/bsf-efmls/en/referring to decision 2/2013 at the
fifth Governing Body.
7Fraleigh and Harvey (2011, p. 116) refer to the US opinion: the list is “far too short and should be expanded”—an
interesting position for a country which is not even party the Treaty. Europe has expressed a similar view, according to
Visser and Borring (2011, pp. 72–73). See also Visser (2013, pp. 265–266), who notes that African countries at one point
suggested nine food crops for inclusion, whereas European countries proposed as many as 287.
8http://www.fao.org/3/a-bp082e.pdf
9http://www.fao.org/3/nb918en/nb918en.pdf (accessed July 1, 2020, recital 31).
10https://mls.planttreaty.org/itt/index.php (accessed March 13, 2019).
11Oddly enough, the Technical Legal Expert Group has not discussed the contract question related to the SMTA, but has
examined only issues of international law.
12https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/material (accessed June 30, 2020).
13Ibid.
14https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sell (accessed March 16, 2019).
15SMTA Art. 7 Applicable law, reads: “The applicable law shall be General Principles of Law, including the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2004, the objectives and the relevant provisions of the Treaty, and, when
necessary for interpretation, the decisions of the GB.”
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